uni'wissen 1-2013_ENG

difficult to monitor this classification, as Volkmann emphasizes. Another tricky aspect of this model he sees is that the risk assessment would perhaps need to be limited to the area of terrorism. However, the criminal acts that have been committed on airplanes are much more diverse: People have blackmailed airlines, hijacked airplanes to escape over international borders, and committed fraud on airplanes – there are even cases of people who have bought an expensive life insurance policy, gotten into an airplane, and caused it to crash so their family could benefit from the payout. Special Groups, Special Risks In order to be prepared for all types of scenarios, Volkmann developed a typology of ethical problems. He analyzed comments by passengers concerning difficulties they’ve encountered at checkpoints and took into account values and norms – for instance those listed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. This analysis led him to identify two individual problem fields. The same thing applies to all passengers: “Checkpoints always invade the private sphere. The question is only how serious this invasion is.” Other risks emerge when particular groups of persons are affected more than others, such as when the personnel orders a follower of the Sikh religion to remove his turban, or when the body scanner sounds the alarm because it has detected an unidentified structure on the body of a female passenger and it turns out to be a breast implant. In addition to these individual and group risks, there are also two collective problem fields: Do the technologies find enough acceptance in society, and what effect does a checkpoint have on society at large? “Security measures could make passengers so nervous that they compromise their behavior. If I fly to Spain to participate in a demonstration, for example, I might decide to leave a banner at home “Checkpoints always invade the private sphere. The question is only how serious this invasion is” designed carefully in order to prevent passen gers from handing bags to other people who’ve already been checked,” says Volkmann. It would also be necessary to ensure that the same pas senger appears at each of the stations – for example with the help of biometric methods like fingerprints or facial recognition technologies. However, the potential for abuse would be high: “When data like these are stored, they awaken desires.” The instruments could be designed in such a way that the biometric data remain with the passenger, for instance on the boarding pass, which can be destroyed after the flight, “but there is always a loss of transparency because the passenger is not entirely certain what happens with the data.” The other model under discussion no longer considers all passengers to be an equal risk, but recommends dividing them up into groups. XPDITE is not looking at what institution assesses the risk and which data it uses to do so – the project is focusing exclusively on the consequences of this model for the checkpoint. For instance, the airport could set up a tunnel for each group, each with a different level of security. The passengers would walk through with their jackets and bags: no lines, no security personnel, no inconveniences. “However, the approach could lead to a reduction in the level of security,” says Volkmann. “A person who finds out how the risk assessment works can easily outwit the system.” Since the criteria used to divide up the passengers into risk groups can’t be transparent, the danger of discriminating against particular societal groups would be particularly high. It would thus be exceedingly Too dangerous: Sharp and blunt objects and containers that hold more than 100 milliliters aren’t allowed in hand luggage. Photos: WoGi, ratatosk, Anterovium, by-studio (all Fotolia) 14 designed carefully in order to prevent passen gers from handing bags to other people who’ve difficult to monitor this classification, as Volkmann emphasizes. Another tricky aspect of this model he sees is that the risk assessment would perhaps need to be limited to the area of gers from handing bags to other people who’ve already been checked,” says Volkmann. It would Too dangerous: Sharp and blunt objects and containers that hold more than 100 milliliters aren’t allowed in hand luggage. Photos: WoGi, ratatosk, Anterovium, by-studio (all Fotolia) difficult to monitor this classification, as Volkmann emphasizes. Another tricky aspect of designed carefully in order to prevent passen gers from handing bags to other people who’ve Too dangerous: Sharp and blunt objects and containers that hold more than 100 milliliters aren’t allowed in hand luggage. Photos: WoGi, ratatosk, Anterovium, by-studio (all Fotolia) 14 designed carefully in order to prevent passen gers from handing bags to other people who’ve

uni'wissen 1-2013_ENG

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